Apollo 1 , originally designated AS-204 , was the first manned mission of the United States Apollo program, a program to land the first person on the Moon. Planned as the first low Earth orbital test of the Apollo Command/Service Command with crew, to be launched on February 21, 1967, the mission never flew; fire cabin during the launch training test at Kennedy Air Force 34 Air Force Station Launch Complex on January 27 killed the three crew members - Command Pilot Virgil I. "Gus" Grissom, Senior Ed White Pilot, and Pilot Roger B. Chaffee - and destroyed the Module Command (CM). The name Apollo 1 , selected by the crew, was officially retired by NASA to commemorate them on 24 April 1967.
Immediately after the fire, NASA held the Apollo 204 Accident Review Board to determine the cause of the fire, and both houses of the United States Congress conducted an investigation of their own committee to oversee NASA's investigation. The source of the flame is determined to be electric, and the fire spreads rapidly due to the flammable nylon material, and high pressure, pure oxygen cabin atmosphere. The astronaut's rescue was prevented by the plug hatch, which could not be opened against the cabin's higher internal pressure. Failure to identify the test as dangerous (because the rocket did not work) caused the rescue to be hampered by poor emergency preparedness.
During the Congressional investigation, then Senator Walter Mondale publicly announced NASA's internal document citing problems with Apollo's main contractor, North American Flight, which came to be known as the "Phillips Report". This revelation humiliates NASA administrator James E. Webb, who is unaware of the existence of the document, and draws controversy over the Apollo program. Despite the congressional displeasure at NASA's lack of openness, the two congressional committees decided that the issues raised in the report had nothing to do with the accident.
The manned Apollo flight was delayed for 20 months while the danger of the Command Module was discussed. However, the development and testing of unmanned skirts Lunar Module (LM) and Saturn V Moon continues. The Saturn IB launch vehicle for Apollo 1, AS-204, was used for the first LM test flight, Apollo 5. The first manned Apollo mission successfully flown by the Apollo 1 reserve crew at Apollo 7 in October 1968.
Video Apollo 1
Crew
First backup crew (April-December 1966)
The second backup crew (December 1966 - January 1967)
Maps Apollo 1
Apollo manned flight test plan
The AS-204 will be the first manned test flight from the Apollo Command/Service Command (CSM) to Earth orbit, launched on Saturn's IB rocket. The AS-204 is to test launch operations, ground tracking and control facilities and the Apollo-Saturn launch assembly performance and will last up to two weeks, depending on how the spacecraft performed.
CSM for this flight, the 012 number created by North American Aviation (NAA), is a Block I version designed before the lunar rendezvous landing strategy is selected; therefore it does not have docking ability with Lunar Module. This is incorporated into Block CSM II design, together with lessons in Block I. Block II will be tested with LM when the latter is ready, and will be used on Moon landing flights.
Flight Operations Director Flight Deke Slayton selected the first Apollo crew in January 1966, with Grissom as Command Pilot, White as Senior Pilot, and rookie Donn F. Eisele as Pilot. But Eisele moved her shoulders twice on a training plane without weight KC135, and had to undergo surgery on 27 January. Slayton replaced him with Chaffee, and NASA announced the crew's election on March 21, 1966. James McDivitt, David Scott and Russell Schweickart were named as backup crews.
On September 29, Walter Schirra, Eisele, and Walter Cunningham were named the main crew for the second CSM Block I, AS-205. NASA plans to follow this with an unmanned test flight from LM (AS-206), then the third manned mission will be the designated double flight US-278 (or AS-207/208), where AS-207 will launch CSM Block II manned first, which will then meet and anchored with an unmanned LM launched on the AS-208.
In March, NASA was studying the possibility of flying its first Apollo mission as a common room that met with the final Gemini Project mission, Gemini 12 in November 1966. But in May, the delay in making Apollo ready to fly alone, and the additional time it took to combine compatibility with Gemini, making it impractical. This became moot when a slip in the US-204 spacecraft's preparation caused the 1966 final target date to be missed, and the mission rescheduled for February 21, 1967.
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Grissom declared his intention to keep his craft in orbit for 14 full days. A newspaper article published on 4 August 1966, called the flight "Apollo 1". CM-012 arrived at Kennedy Space Center on August 26, labeled Apollo One by NAA on its packaging.
In October 1966, NASA announced the flights would bring a small television camera to broadcast live from the Command Module. The camera will also be used to allow the flight controller to monitor the instrument panel of the spacecraft in flight. Television cameras are brought on top of all manned Apollo missions.
Insignia
The Grissom crew received approval in June 1966 to design a mission patch under the name Apollo 1 . The design center describes the Command/Service Module flying over the southeastern United States with a prominent Florida (launch point). The moon is visible in the distance, symbolic of the ultimate goal of the program. The yellow border carries missions and names of astronauts with other boundaries set with stars and stripes, trimmed with gold. This badge was designed by the crew, with artwork done by North American Aviation employee Allen Stevens.
Space Shuttle Preparation
Apollo Command/Service Module is much larger and much more complex than the design of the spacecraft previously applied. In October 1963, Joseph F. Shea was appointed manager of the Apollo Space Program (ASPO), responsible for managing the design and construction of CSM and LM. In a review meeting of the spacecraft held with Shea on August 19, 1966 (the week before delivery), the crew expressed concern about the amount of combustible material (especially nylon nets and Velcro) in the cabin, which both astronauts and technicians found comfortable to hold the tools and on-site equipment. Although Shea gave the spacecraft graduation, after the meeting they gave her a portrait of the crew they showed with their heads bowed and hands clasped in prayer, with the inscription:
Not that we do not trust you, Joe, but this time we decided to forget about your head.
Shea gave orders to her staff to tell North America to remove combustible material from the cabin, but did not oversee the matter privately.
The US spacecraft sent the CM-012 aircraft to the Kennedy Space Center on August 26, 1966, under the Conditional Flight Certification Certificate: 113 significant incomplete engineering changes had to be completed at KSC. But that's not all; 623 additional technical change orders made and completed after delivery. Grissom became very frustrated with the inability of the training simulator engineers to follow the spacecraft changes, that he took the oranges from the tree next to his house and hung them in the simulator.
Command and Service Modules are mated at KSC height spaces in September, and joint system testing is performed. The altitude test was first performed unmanned, then with main and backup crews, from 10 October to 30 December. During this test, the Environmental Control Unit in the Command Module was found to have design flaws, and was sent back to the manufacturer for design changes and rework. The returned ECU is then leaked water/glycol coolant, and should be returned a second time. Also during this time, the propellant tank in the Service Module 017 has been damaged during testing on the NAA, which drives the separation of the module and removal from the chamber so that the Service Module can be tested for signs of tank problems. These tests are negative.
In December, the second US-205 Block I flight was canceled as unnecessary; and Schirra, Eisele and Cunningham were transferred as reserve crews for Apollo 1. McDivitt's crew is now promoted to the main crew of Block II/LM mission, re-established US-258 because the US-205 launch vehicle will be used in place of the US-207. The third manned mission is planned to launch CSM and LM together on Saturn V (AS-503) into an elliptical Earth elliptical orbit (MEO), which will be manned by Frank Borman, Michael Collins and William Anders. McDivitt, Scott and Schweickart have started their training for the US-258 at CM-101 at the NAA plant in Downey, California, when the Apollo 1 accident occurred.
After all the remarkable CSM-012 hardware issues were fixed, the reconstructed shuttle finally completed a successful landing space test with Schirra's backup crew on December 30th. According to a final report from the accident investigation board, "On post-pilot training of crew reserve flights express their satisfaction with the conditions and performance of the spacecraft." This would seem contrary to the account given at Lost Moon: The Perilous Voyage of Apollo 13 by Jeffrey Kluger and astronaut James Lovell, that "When the trio came out of the ship,... Schirra made it clear that he was not happy with what he had seen," and that he later warned Grissom and Shea that "nothing which is wrong with this ship which I can point to, but it just makes me uncomfortable Something about it does not ring true, "and the Grissom should come out at the first sign of trouble.
Following a successful altitude test, the spacecraft was removed from the altitude room on January 3, 1967, and was mated to the Saturn IB launch vehicle on pad 34 on January 6th.
You have to get it out of your mind. There is always the possibility that you may experience catastrophic failure, of course; this can happen on any flight; it can happen to the last and the first. So, you just plan as best you can to take care of all these possibilities, and you get a trained crew and you fly.
Accident
The colok test
The launch simulation on January 27, 1967, on pad 34, is a "plug-out" test to determine whether the spacecraft will operate nominally at (simulation) internal strength while detached from all cables and umbilicals. Passing this test is very important to make the February 21 launch date. The test is considered harmless because neither the launch vehicle nor the spacecraft is laden with fuel or cryogenics, and all pyrotechnic systems (explosive bolts) are disabled.
At 1:00 pm EST (1800 GMT) on January 27th, the first Grissom, then Chaffee, and White enters the Command Module completely under pressure, and tied up in their seats and connected to the oxygen system and spacecraft communications. Grissom immediately noticed a strange smell in the air circulating through his clothes that he compared with "buttermilk acid", and the simulated countdown was held at 1:20 pm, while air samples were taken. No odor causes can be found, and the countdown resumes at 2:42 pm. The accident investigation found this odor unrelated to the fire.
Three minutes after the count is resumed, the hatchery installation begins. It consists of three parts: a removable hatch, which remains inside the cabin; the hinged outer hull, which is part of the spacecraft's heat shield; and an outer hatch cover, which is part of the protection of the protective cover covering the entire Command Module to protect it from aerodynamic heating at launch, and from the launch of the missile launch during launch. The portion of the hold hatch is partially, but not completely, installed in place because the flexible protective cap cover is slightly distorted by a number of wiring underneath it to provide internal power simulation. (The spacecraft fuel cell reactor is not loaded for this test.) After the hatch is sealed, the air in the cabin is replaced with pure oxygen at 16.7 psi (115 kPa), 2 psi (14 kPa) higher than atmospheric pressure.
Movements by astronauts are detected by the astronauts' inertial spacecraft measurement unit and astronaut biomedical sensor, and are also indicated by an increase in the flow of outer space clothing, and the sound of clogged Grissom microphones. There is no evidence to identify the movement, or whether it is related to fire. The jammed microphone is part of the problem with the communication circle connecting the crew, Operations Building and Checkout, and control room complex blockhouse 34. Bad communication causes Grissom to comment: "How will we get to the Moon if we can not talk between two or three buildings ? " Simulation counts are held again at 5:40 pm while attempts are made to solve communication problems. All countdown functions until simulated internal power transfers have been successfully completed by 6:20 pm, but at 6:30 the count remains held at T minus 10 minutes.
Fire
The crew members use the time to run their checklists again, when there is a momentary increase in AC Bus 2 voltage. Nine seconds later (at 6: 31: 04.7), one of the astronauts (some listeners and laboratory analysis showed Grissom) exclaimed "Hey!" or "Fire!"; this was followed by two seconds of trembling sound through Grissom's open microphone. This was immediately followed at 6: 31: 06.2 (23: 31: 06.2 GMT) by someone (believed by most listeners, and supported by laboratory analysis, to be Chaffee) said, "[I, or We] had a fire in the cockpit. "After 6.8 seconds of silence, a second, very chaotic transmission takes place, interpreted by various listeners as:
- "They fight a bad fire - Let's get out.... Open 'er up"
- "We have a bad fire - Let's get out.... We're burning", or
- "I reported a bad fire.... I am out....".
This transmission, believed by some of its listeners is White, lasted for 5.0 seconds and ended with a cry of agony.
Several of the blocking witnesses said that they saw White on a television monitor, grabbing the hatch release handle inside as the fire in the cabin spread from left to right.
The intensity of the fire fed by pure oxygen causes the pressure to rise to 29 psi (200 kPa), which breaks the wall in Command Module at 6:31:19 (23:31:19 GMT, initial phase of fire). The fire and gas then rush outside the Command Module through an open access panel to the two levels of the service pad structure. The strong heat, thick smoke, and ineffective gas masks designed for toxic fumes rather than thick smoke hinder the efforts of the crew to save the men. There are concerns that the Command Module has exploded, or soon, and that fire may have triggered a solid fuel rocket in the launch tower above the Command Module, which is likely to kill nearby ground personnel, and may have destroyed the runway.
When the pressure is released by the cracked cabin, the convective air flow causes the flame to spread throughout the cab, starting the second phase. The third phase begins when most of the oxygen is consumed and replaced with atmospheric air, essentially extinguishing the fire, but causing the concentration of carbon monoxide and high thick smoke to fill the cabin, and a large amount of soot to be deposited on the surface as it is cooled.
It took five minutes for the pad workers to open all three hatching layers, and they could not drop the hatches onto the cabin floor as intended, so they pushed it out of the way to one side. Although the cabin lights remain lit, they initially can not find astronauts through thick smoke. When the smoke was clean, they found the bodies, but could not get rid of them. The fire has melted some of Grissom and White's nylon chamber suits and the hoses connecting them with life-support systems. Grissom had removed her restraints and was lying on the floor of the spacecraft. White Restraints were burned, and he was found lying on his side under the hatch. It has been determined that he has tried to open the hold according to emergency procedures, but can not do so against internal pressure. Chaffee was found tied in his right chair, because the procedure called him to maintain communications until White opened the hold. Due to the massive strands of nylon melts melting the astronauts into the cabin interior, removing a corpse took almost 90 minutes.
Investigation
As a result of the failure of the mission flight Gemini 8 on March 17, 1966, NASA Deputy Administrator Robert Seamans wrote and implemented Management Instructions 8621.1 on 14 April 1966, defines the Missing Mission Policy and Procedures . This modified NASA accident procedure, based on an investigation of an aircraft crash, provides the Deputy Administrator with an option to conduct an independent investigation into a major failure, beyond which the Office Officer is normally responsible. It states, "It is NASA's policy to investigate and document the causes of all major mission failures occurring in its space behavior and aviation activities and to take appropriate corrective action as a result of its findings and recommendations."
Immediately after the Apollo 1 fire, to avoid any conflict of interest, NASA Administrator James E. Webb called on President Lyndon B. Johnson to allow NASA to handle an investigation in accordance with established procedures, pledging to be honest in assessing errors, and to keeping the right congressional leaders informed. Seamans later directed the formation of the Apollo 204 Review Board led by Langley Research Center director Floyd L. Thompson, who included astronaut Frank Borman, Maxime Faget space designer and six others. On February 1, Cornell University professor Frank A. Long left the blackboard, and was succeeded by Dr. Robert W. Van Dolah, of the US Mining Bureau. The next day, the chief engineer of North America for Apollo, George Jeffs, also left.
Seamans immediately ordered all the confiscated Apollo 1 hardware and software, to be released only under the control of the board. After thorough stereo photography documentation from the interior of CM-012, the board instructs its demolition using the tested procedure by disassembling the same CM-014, and conducting a thorough investigation of each section. The board also reviewed the results of the astronaut autopsy and interviewed witnesses. Seamans sent a weekly status report of the progress of the investigation, and the council issued its final report on April 5, 1967.
Cause of death
According to the Council, Grissom suffered severe third-degree burns on more than a third of his body and his outer garments were mostly destroyed. White suffered third-degree burns in nearly half of her body and a quarter of her outer space had melted. Chaffee suffered third-degree burns in almost a quarter of her body and a small portion of her outer garments were damaged. The autopsy report confirms that the main cause of death for all three astronauts is a heart attack caused by high concentrations of carbon monoxide. Burns experienced by the crew are not believed to be a major factor, and it is concluded that most of them have occurred postmortem. Asphyxia occurs after a fire melts the astronauts and oxygen canisters, exposing them to the deadly cabin atmosphere.
The main cause of the accident
The review board identified several major factors combined to cause astronaut fires and deaths:
- The ignition source is most likely associated with "vulnerable cables carrying spacecraft power" and "vulnerable pipes carrying combustible and corrosive coolers"
- Pure oxygen atmosphere at higher pressures of the atmosphere
- The cabin is sealed with hatch cover that can not be erased quickly at high pressures
- Extensive distribution of combustible materials in the cabin
- Inadequate emergency preparedness (rescue or medical assistance, and crew escape)
Ignition source
The review board ruled that electrical power failed momentarily at 23:30 GMT, and found evidence of some electric arc in the interior equipment. They can not identify exactly a source of ignition. They decided that fire would most likely start near the floor in the lower left of the cabin, close to the Environmental Control Unit. It spreads from the left wall of the cabin to the right, with the affected floor only briefly.
The council notes that silver-plated copper wire, which runs through the environmental control unit near the middle sofa, has been detached from Teflon insulation and destroyed by repeated opening and closing of a small access door.
The weak point in the cable also ran near the intersection in the water leaked ethylene glycol/water line. Electrolysis of ethylene glycol solution with silver anode was discovered at MSC on May 29, 1967, being a hazard capable of causing severe exothermic reactions, triggering a mixture of ethylene glycol in the pure oxygen atmosphere of CM. Experiments at the Illinois Institute of Technology confirm the existing dangers for silver-plated cables, but not for copper alone or nickel-plated copper. In July, ASPO directed North America and Grumman to ensure no silver or silver electrical contacts exist around the possible glycol spills on the Apollo spacecraft.
Pure oxygen atmosphere
A plug-out test has been performed to simulate the launch procedure, with a pressure cabin with pure oxygen at a nominal launch rate of 16.7 psi (115 kPa), 2 psi (14 kPa) above standard atmospheric sea level pressures. This is more than five times the oxygen pressure of 3 psi (21 kPa) in the atmosphere, and provides an environment where ingredients that are not normally considered flammable will burn.
High pressure oxygen atmospheres are similar to those that have been successfully used in Mercury and Gemini programs. The pre-launch pressure is deliberately larger than the ambient to dissipate the air containing nitrogen and replace it with pure oxygen, and also to close the cover of the stopper door. During the launch, the pressure will be gradually reduced to a 5-psi level on the plane (34 kPa), providing enough oxygen for astronauts to breathe while reducing the risk of fire. The Apollo 1 crew had successfully tested this procedure with their spacecraft in the Operation Room and the Inspection Room (vacuum) on October 18 and 19, 1966, and Schirra's reserve crew Eisele and Cunningham repeated it on Dec. 30. Board investigations note that, during this test, the Command Module has been fully pressured with pure oxygen four times, for a total of six hours and fifteen minutes, two and a half hours longer than during the plug-out test.
Flammable materials in the cabin
The review board cites "many types and classes of combustible materials" close to the source of ignition. The NASA crew's department department has installed 34 square feet (3.2 m 2 ) from Velcro all over the spacecraft, almost like a carpet. The Velcro is found to be highly flammable in a 100% high-pressure oxygen environment. Astronaut Buzz Aldrin stated in his book Men From Earth that flammable materials were removed per 19 plane crew complaints and Joseph Shea's orders, but were replaced before August 26 shipment to Cape Kennedy.
Hatch design
The inner hatch cover uses a plug design door, sealed by higher pressure inside the cabin than on the outside. The normal pressure level used for the launch (2 psi (14 kPa) above the ambient) creates enough strength to prevent removing the cover until excess pressure is released. Emergency procedures call Grissom to open the cabin vent valve first, allowing White to remove the cover, but Grissom is prevented from doing this because the valve is located on the left, behind the initial fire wall. Also, while the system can easily vent normal pressure, its flow capacity is entirely incapable of handling the rapid increase to 29 psi (200 kPa) absolute caused by intense heat.
North America initially suggested an open hatch out and used explosive bolts to blow hatches in an emergency, as had been done at the Mercury Project. NASA disagreed, arguing the hold could be inadvertently exposed, as happened on Grissom's Liberty Bell 7 flight, so the designer of the Manned Space Center rejected an explosive design that supported a mechanically operated operation for Gemini and the Program Apollo. Prior to the fire, the Apollo astronauts had recommended changing the design to the outer-opening hatch, and this was already scheduled for inclusion in the Command Block II Module design. According to Donald K. Slayton's testimony before a House investigation of the accident, it is based on the ease of getting out of space and at the end of the flight, not for emergency exit. Emergency preparedness
The Council notes that: the test planner fails to identify the test as dangerous; Emergency equipment (such as gas masks) is inadequate to handle this type of fire; fire, rescue, and medical team were absent; and that space work and access areas contain many hurdles for emergency response such as steps, sliding doors, and sharp turns.
Choice of pure oxygen atmosphere
When designing the Mercury spacecraft, NASA has considered using a mixture of nitrogen/oxygen to reduce the risk of fire near launch, but refused it based on two considerations. First, the nitrogen used with reduced in-flight stress carries the risk of decompression disease (known as "bend"). But the decision to eliminate the use of any gas but oxygen was crystallized when a serious accident occurred on 21 April 1960, where the test pilot McDonnell Aircraft G.B. North fainted and badly injured when testing Mercury's cabin/space atmosphere system in a vacuum. The problem is that nitrogen-rich (oxygen-poor) air is leaking from the cabin into space clothing. North American Aviation suggests using a mixture of oxygen/nitrogen for Apollo, but NASA rejects this. Pure oxygen design is considered safer, less complicated, and lighter.
In his monograph Project Apollo: Tough's Decision, Deputy Administrator Seamans writes that NASA's worst error in engineering assessment is not to run fire tests on the Command Module before the plug-out test. In the first episode of the BBC 2009 documentary NASA: Triumph and Tragedy , Jim McDivitt said that NASA does not know how a 100% oxygen atmosphere will affect combustion. Similar statements by other astronauts are revealed in the 2007 documentary In the Moon Shadow .
Other oxygen incidents
Several fires in the high oxygen test environment had occurred before the Apollo fire. In 1962, USAF Colonel B. Dean Smith tested the Gemini space suit with a colleague in a pure oxygen room at Brooks Air Force Base in San Antonio, Texas when a fire broke out, destroying space. Smith and colleagues escaped.
Other oxygen fire incidents are documented in archived reports in the National Air and Space Museum, such as:
- Cabin Room Atmosphere Election. Part II: Fire and Blast Hazaards [ sic ] in the Cabin. (Emanuel M. Roth, Dept of Aeronautics Medicine and Bioastronautics, Lovelace Foundation for Medical Education and Research C.1964-1966.)
- "Fire Prevention in Manned Space and Oxygen Atmospheric Test Space." (MSC NASA General Working Paper 10 063. October 10, 1966)
The incident also occurred in the Soviet space program, but because of the government's policy on secrecy, this was not disclosed until after the Apollo fire 1. Cosmonaut Valentin Bondarenko died on March 23, 1961, from the burns he suffered while participating in a 15-day endurance experiment in an oxygen isolation room high, less than three weeks before the first Vostok manned space flight; this was disclosed on January 28, 1986.
During the Voskhod 2 mission in March 1965, cosmonauts Pavel Belyayev and Alexey Leonov could not completely close the hatch of the spacecraft after Leonov's first historic trip in space. The spacecraft environmental control system responds to leaky air by adding more oxygen to the cabin, causing the concentration level to rise as high as 45%. The crew and the ground controllers are worried about the possibility of fire, given the death of Bondarenko four years earlier.
Political fallout
The committees in both houses of the US Congress with oversight from the space program immediately launched an investigation, including the Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space Science, led by Sen. Clinton P. Anderson. Seamans, Webb, Space Flight Administered Drs. George E. Mueller, and Apollo Program Director Major General Samuel C. Phillips was summoned to testify before the Anderson committee.
At the February 27 hearing, Senator Walter F. Mondale asked Webb if he knew of a report about the extraordinary problem with the performance of the North American Flight on the Apollo contract. Webb replied he did not, and was suspended to his subordinates in the witness panel. Mueller and Phillips replied that they were not aware of such "reports" either.
However, by the end of 1965, more than a year before the accident, Phillips had led a "tiger team" investigating the causes of inadequate quality, scheduling delays, and cost swelling both at Apollo CSM and the second-stage Saturn V (which North America is also the prime contractor). He gave an oral presentation (with transparency) of his team's findings to Mueller and Seaman, as well as presenting it in a memo to North American president John L. Atwood, where Mueller added his hard-tone memo to Atwood.
During Mondale's 1967 questioning about what is known as the "Phillips Report", Seaman feared Mondale might actually have seen a copy of Phillips's presentation, and replied that the contractor had occasionally experienced progress reviews in place; maybe this is what Mondale information means. Mondale continues to refer to the "Report" even though Phillips refuses to characterize him as such, and is angered by what he considers to be Webb's fraud and concealment of the crucial program issues of Congress, he questioned NASA's North American election as the prime contractor. Seamans later wrote that Webb loudly sentenced him on a taxi trip to leave the hearing, for voluntary information that led to the disclosure of Phillips's memo.
On May 11, Webb issued a statement defending NASA's November 1961 election of North America as the prime contractor for Apollo. This was followed on June 9 by Seaman archiving a seven-page memorandum documenting the selection process. Webb finally provided a copy of Phillips's controlled memo to Congress. The Senate Committee noted in its latest report, NASA's testimony that "the [Phillips] task force has no effect on accidents, does not lead to accidents, and is not related to accidents", but stated in its recommendations:
Nonetheless, in NASA's assessment, the contractor then made significant progress in addressing the problem, the committee believes that it should be informed of the situation. The Committee does not object to the position of the NASA Administrator, that all details of the Government/contractor relationship should not be entered into the public domain. However, that position can not at all be used as an argument for not bringing this or other serious situations to the attention of the committee.
Senator Freshman Edward W. Brooke III and Charles H. Percy jointly wrote the Addition section added to the committee's report, punishing NASA stronger than Anderson for not revealing Phillips's review to Congress. Mondale writes for himself, even more additional Supplemental Views, accusing NASA of "evading,... lack of directness,... condescending attitude toward Congress,... refusal to respond fully and frankly to legitimate Congress questions, and. serious attention to corporate sensitivity at the time of national tragedy. "
The potential political threat to Apollo exploded, largely because of the support of President Lyndon B. Johnson, who at the time was still using measures of influence with Congress from his own Senator's experience. He was a staunch supporter of NASA from the beginning, had even recommended the Moon program to President John F. Kennedy in 1961, and was skilled in describing it as part of Kennedy's legacy.
The relationship between NASA and North America has worsened due to accusations of blame. North America believes it does not work it is not responsible for the fatal error in the design of the spacecraft's atmosphere. Finally, Webb contacted Atwood, and demanded he or Chief Engineer Harrison A. Storms resign. Atwood chose to fire Storms.
On the NASA side, Joseph Shea used barbiturates and alcohol to help her cope. NASA administrator James Webb is becoming increasingly worried about Shea's mental state. Shea was asked to take an extended voluntary leave, but Shea refused, threatening to resign instead of taking time off. As a compromise, he agrees to meet a psychiatrist and adhere to an independent assessment of his psychological fitness. Approach to get rid of Shea from his position also did not work. Finally, six months after the fire, Shea's superiors assigned him back to NASA headquarters in Washington, D.C. Shea felt that her new post was "not a job", and left after only two months.
Recovery program
Gene Kranz held a staff meeting at Mission Control three days after the crash, delivering a speech that later became one of NASA's principles. Speaking of the overall error and attitude surrounding the Apollo program before the crash, he stated: "We are too 'gung-ho' about the schedule and we block all the problems we see every day of our work.Each element of the program is in trouble and so are we. "He reminded the team of danger and mercilessly from their efforts, and stated new requirements that every member of every team in mission control becomes" tough and competent ", requiring nothing less than perfection throughout the NASA program. In 2003, after the Space Shuttle disaster of Columbia, NASA administrator Sean O'Keefe quoted Kranz's speech, applying it to the crew of Columbia .
redesigning the Command Module
After the fire, the Apollo program was blocked for review and redesign. The Command module is found to be very dangerous and, in some cases, recklessly assembled (eg, misplaced socket locks found in the cab).
It was decided that the remaining Blok I spacecraft would only be used for unmanned Saturn V test flight. All manned missions will use the Bloc II spacecraft, where many design modifications to the Command Module are made:
- The cabin atmosphere at launch is adjusted for 60% oxygen and 40% nitrogen at sea level pressures: 14.7 psi (101 kPa). During the climb, the cabin quickly ventilated to 5 psi (34 kPa), releasing about 2/3 of the gas originally present at launch. Ventilation is then closed and the environmental control system maintains the nominal cabin pressure of 5 PSI (34 kPa) as the spacecraft continues to vacuum. The cabin is then cleaned very slowly (thrown into space and simultaneously replaced with 100% oxygen), so the nitrogen concentration falls asymptotically to zero the next day. Although the new cabin launch atmosphere is significantly safer than 100% oxygen, it still contains nearly three times the amount of oxygen present in ordinary sea level air (20.9% oxygen). This is necessary to ensure sufficient oxygen partial pressures when astronauts remove their helmets after they reach orbit. (60% of 5 psi is 3 psi, compared with 20.9% of 14.7 psi (101 kPa), or 3.07 psi (21.2 kPa) at sea level.)
- The environment in the astronaut pressure setting has not changed. Due to the rapid decline in cabin (and suit) pressure during ascent, decompression sickness is likely unless nitrogen has been cleared of astronaut tissue before it is launched. They will still inhale pure oxygen, starting a few hours before launch, until they remove their helmets in orbit. Avoiding "bends" is considered to be worth the risk of oxygen accelerated residual fire in a suit.
- The nylon used in Block I clothing is replaced with a Block II coat with Beta fabrics, a very melt-proof fabric, woven from fiberglass and coated with Teflon.
- Block II is already planned to use the completely redesigned hatch that opens outwards, and can be opened in less than five seconds. Unintentional accidental concerns are overcome by using pressurized nitrogen cartridges to induce an emergency release mechanism, not the explosive bolts used in Project Mercury.
- The combustible material in the cabin is replaced with a self-extinguishing version.
- Pipes and cables are covered with protective insulation. Aluminum pipe is replaced with stainless steel pipe using brazing joints if possible.
Comprehensive protocols are implemented to document the construction and maintenance of spacecraft.
New mission naming scheme
The astronaut widows asked that Apollo 1 be reserved for flights their husbands had never made, and on April 24, 1967, Associate Administrator for Manned Space Flight, Dr. George E. Mueller, announces this change formally: AS-204 will be recorded as Apollo 1, "the first Apollo Saturn flight - failed in ground tests". Although three unmanned Apollo missions (AS-201, US-202, and AS-203) have occurred before, only AS-201 and AS-202 are carrying spacecraft. Therefore, the next mission, the first unmanned Saturn V pilot flight (AS-501) will be designated Apollo 4, with all subsequent flights numbered sequentially in the flown order. The first three flights will no longer be numbered, and the names Apollo 2 and Apollo 3 will be officially unused. Dr. Mueller considers AS-201 and AS-202, the first and second flights of Apollo Block I CSM, respectively as Apollo 2 and 3.
Hiatus manned flights allow work to pursue the Saturn V and Lunar Module, which face their own delays. Apollo 4 missiles flew in November 1967. The Saturn IB Apollo1 (AS-204) rocket was lowered from Launch Complex 34, then reassembled at Launch complex 37B and used to launch Apollo 5, unmanned orbit Earth test flight from the first LM Lunar Module -1 , in January 1968. The second unmanned Saturn V AS-502 flew as Apollo 6 in April 1968, and Grissom's reserve crew from Wally Schirra, Don Eisele, and Walter Cunningham, eventually flew orbital test missions as Apollo 7 (AS-205 ), in Block II of CSM in October 1968.
Complex Launch 34
After the Apollo 1 fire, Launch Complex 34 is then used only for the launch of Apollo 7 and then disassembled onto the concrete launch pad, which remains on the site ( 28.52182Ã, Â ° N 80,561258Ã, Â ° W / 28,52182; -80,561258 ) along with some other reinforced concrete and steel structures. The pedestal contains two plaques to commemorate the crew. Every year families from Apollo 1 crew are invited to the site for anniversaries, and Kennedy Space Center Visitor Complex includes the site during a tour of the historic Cape Canaveral launch site.
In January 2005, three granite benches, built by a college classmate from one of the astronauts, were installed at a location on the southern edge of the launch pad. Each bears the name of one of the astronauts and the emblem of his military service.
Stars, famous buildings on the Moon and Mars
- Apollo astronauts often align their inertial space navigation platform and determine their position relative to the Earth and the Moon by looking at the star set with the optical instrument. As a practical joke, Apollo 1 crew names three stars in the Apollo catalog and introduces them to the NASA documentation. Gamma Cassiopeiae becomes Navi - Ivan (middle name of Gus Grissom) is somewhat reversed. Iota Ursae Majoris becomes Dnoces - "Second" spelled backwards, for Edward H. White II. And Gamma Velorum became Regor - Roger (Chaffee) countless backwards. These names were quickly trapped after the Apollo 1 crash and were regularly used by the next Apollo crew.
- The crater on the Moon and the hill on Mars is named after three Apollo 1 astronauts.
Civil and other Warnings
- Three public schools in Huntsville, Alabama (home of the George C. Marshall Space Flight Center and American Space & Rocket Center): Virgil I. Grissom High School, White Ed School, and Chaffee Elementary School
- Ed White II Basic e-STEM (Basic Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics) Magnet School in El Lago, Texas, near Johnson Space Center. White lives in El Lago, (adjacent to Neil Armstrong).
- Virgil I. Grissom Middle Schools in Mishawaka, Indiana, Sterling Heights, Michigan, and Tinley Park, Illinois.
- Virgil Grissom Primary School in Princeton, Iowa, and Edward White Elementary School in Eldridge, Iowa, both part of the North Scott Community District School also named three other elementary schools after astronauts Neil Armstrong, John Glenn, and Alan Shepard
- School # 7 in Rochester, New York, also known as Virgil I. Grissom School. (www.rcsdk12.org).
- Three streets in Amherst, New York, named for Roger Chaffee, Edward White, and Gus Grissom Drive. A street was named for Virgil I. Grissom at the same time, but when no house was built on it in 1991, the road sign was removed. (www.amherst.wgrz.com) (https://www.google.com/maps/place/Gus Grissom Dr, Buffalo, NY 14228/@ 43.0135412, -78.8221272,17z/data =! 4m5! 3m4! 1s0x89d3721e0b21bc39: 0xc231682fdc2b60b8! 8m2! 3d43.0124295! 4d-78.8210757? Hl = en & amp; authuser =)
- Three man-made oil drilling islands in the harbor in Long Beach, California, named Grissom, White and Chaffee. A fourth island named after Theodore Freeman, an astronaut selected from the USAF in 1963, was killed in an accident T-38 jet in 1964 at Ellington Air Force Base.
- The Roger B. Chaffee Planetarium is located at the Grand Rapids Public Museum
- Roger B. Chaffee Scholarship Fund in Grand Rapids, Michigan, annually to commemorate the honor of Chaffee a student wishing to pursue a career in engineering or science.
- The three adjacent parks in Fullerton, California, are each named for Grissom, Chaffee, and White. These parks are located near Hughes Aircraft's former research and development facility. Hughes's subsidiary, Hughes Space and Communications Company, makes components for the Apollo program.
- Two buildings on the Purdue University campus in West Lafayette, Indiana, are named for Grissom and Chaffee (both Purdue alumni). Grissom Hall has an Industrial Engineering School (and is home to the Aeronautics and Astronautics School before moving to the new Neil Armstrong Engineering Building). Chaffee Hall, built in 1965, is the administrative complex of Maurice J. Zucrow Laboratories in which combustion, propulsion, gas dynamics, and related fields are studied. The Chaffee Hall contains a 72-seat auditorium, offices, and administrative staff.
- A tree for every astronaut is planted in NASA's Astronaut Memorial Grove at the Johnson Space Center in Houston, Texas, not far from the Saturn V building, along with trees for every astronaut from the Columbia and Columbia Challengers disaster. The space center tour pauses near the forest for a moment of silence, and trees can be seen from the nearest NASA Road 1.
Time CM-012
Apollo 1 Command Module has not been shown publicly. After the accident, the plane was moved and taken to the Kennedy Space Center to facilitate the dismantling of the review board to investigate the cause of the fire. When the investigation was completed, it was transferred to NASA Langley Research Center in Hampton, Virginia, and placed in a secure storage warehouse. On February 17, 2007, parts of CM-012 were moved about 90 feet (27 m) to a newer warehouse and controlled by the environment. Just a few weeks earlier, Gus Grissom's brother Lowell openly advised CM-012 to be buried permanently in the concrete remains of Launch Complex 34.
On January 27, 2017, 50th anniversary of the fire, NASA put the hold of Apollo 1 on the screen next to the remnants of Challenger and Columbia. "It's the way, the way, the old way is delayed, but we're excited about it," said Scott Grissom, son of the older Gus Grissom.
In popular culture
- The accident and the result are the subject of episode 2 "Apollo One", from the 1998 HBO miniseries From Earth to the Moon .
- Missions and accidents are covered by the ABC 2015 television series, The Astronaut Wives Club , episode 8 "Rendezvous", and 9 "Abort".
- This incident is the subject of the Public Service Broadcasting Line Fire in the Cockpit of their 2015 album The Race for Space.
See also
- List of accidents and incidents related to space
- STS-1
- STS-51-L
References
Note
Source of the article : Wikipedia
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